A purchaser filed a cross-complaint
Appellant property owners sought review of a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County (California), which entered findings and judgment on the property owners’ complaint against appellee purchaser, and entered separate findings on a receiver’s report. The property owners had filed an action to terminate a contract of sale, quiet title, and appoint a receiver, as well as for monies due on promissory notes.
A purchaser filed a cross-complaint with regard to a contract for the sale of property he had entered into with property owners. A receiver had been appointed after the property owners claimed the buyer had defaulted under the purchase agreement. The trial court determined that the purchaser was entitled to a decree of specific performance on the contract. The court held, inter alia, that the portion of the judgment that fixed liability upon the owners under a theory of vicarious liability for the conduct of the receiver was improper and constituted reversible error, while it sustained that part of the judgment that terminated the receivership and discharged the receiver. ADA compliance attorney near me The court ruled that the trial court properly denied the receiver attorney’s fees for services rendered after the appointment of the receiver because the attorney also was attorney for the property owners. Further, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings that the owners had waived the requirement of strict compliance with the provision regarding prompt payment, and had not given notice of its reimposition prior to the filing of the complaint.
The court reversed in part the judgment awarding specific performance to the purchaser, affirmed in part, and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion.
Defendants, a real estate broker and others, appealed an order from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which denied their motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff buyers’ claims for fraud, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, declaratory and injunctive relief, unfair business practices, and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from a real estate transaction.
The arbitration provision in the agreement, which was a standard form residential purchase agreement, stated that arbitration could be compelled under the California Code of Civil Procedure and that interpretation of the agreement was to be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. Based on the involvement of nonparties to the agreement and the overlap of issues of law and fact, the trial court invoked its authority under Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2, subd. (c), denying arbitration and joining all parties in a single action to be adjudicated in court. The court held that the arbitration agreement did not incorporate the procedural provisions of the FAA, which did not apply in state court unless the parties expressly adopted them. California’s rules of contract interpretation were consistent with those employed under the FAA and thus applied even when interpretation under the FAA was specified. Under the plain meaning rule, the agreement required the application of the procedural provisions of the California Arbitration Act, Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1280-1294.2. The trial court appropriately exercised its discretion under § 1281.2, subd. (c), in denying arbitration.
The court affirmed the order.